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 Religion is a dominant influence in household decision-making and is an important factor 
in understanding intra-household bargaining power, especially within developing countries. It is 
important to understand the extent to which religious beliefs affect decisions made within the 
household when designing interventions to improve women’s agency. This paper examines the 
fourth wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey using the difference-in-differences method to 
analyze the impact of Islamic religiosity on the likelihood of allowing women within the 
household to make certain decisions in eight critical categories. While stereotypical beliefs may 
negatively correlate women’s bargaining power and high levels of religiosity within the Islamic 
faith, the role of Muslim religiosity on women’s bargaining power is found to be not statistically 
significant. This suggests that programming catering to religious norms is not adequate in 

































I. Introduction  
 
Religion influences many factors of life for a large majority of the world’s population. 
While the popularity of religious topics appears in areas of study such as psychology and 
medicine, relatively few studies have attempted to link religiosity to economic outcomes vice 
versa. Religion has been linked to less deviant behavior, better health, marital stability, and 
higher levels of self-reported well-being (Gorman, 2020). Conversely, religion has played a role 
in the construction of gender norms. Its hegemonic impact on women has defined their 
submission under “heads” of households as divinely ordained (Abraham, 2019). Social 
constructs such as religion have the potential to create social inequalities through certain 
expectations (Pangaribowo, Tsegai, Sukamdi, 2018). By understanding these implications, 
efficiencies may be improved not only within the household, but also beyond. This research 
study intends to understand the effects of religious and very religious Muslim households on 
gender-differentiated decision-making via the longitudinal dataset from the Indonesia Family 
Life Survey (IFLS).  
The IFLS is an on-going longitudinal survey conducted by the RAND Corporation, an 
American nonprofit global policy think tank. The data is designed to provide information for 
studying behaviors and outcomes not only within the household, but also within the community. 
There are many factors collected and analyzed including consumption, income, assets, education, 
migration, labor market outcomes, marriage, fertility, contraceptive use, community engagement 
and program use, health care, processes of household decision-making and more (RAND, 2020). 
The sample demographic represents approximately 83% of the population which includes 
roughly 30,000 individuals across 13 out of the 27 provinces of Indonesia.  
The IFLS dataset has been administered in waves over the past 21 years. Each wave 
contains both household level and community level data separated into books by some of the 
aforementioned components analyzed by RAND. The first wave, IFLS1, was conducted in 1993-
1994, IFLS2 in 1997-1998, IFLS3 in 2000, IFLS4 in 2007-2008, and IFLS5 in 2014-2015. 
Religiosity was not measured until IFLS4; therefore, this study will utilize the fourth wave and 
the datasets within the household surveys, setting aside the datasets within the community 
surveys. Each wave is broken down into books, or various questionnaires, and this research will 
be using Book K, focusing on household characteristics and Book 3A, focusing on decision-
making, religiosity, and religion.  
The primary contribution of this study is estimation of quantitative measures of 
religiosity with respect to women’s bargaining power using IFLS data and documentation. To 
address this, 10,900 observations within the IFLS4 dataset were observed from the 
questionnaires. I utilized the difference-in-differences method to analyze the differential effects 
of various combinations of Islam and religiosity on women’s bargaining power across eight 
critical categories: food expenditure, large expenditure, children’s clothing, education, and 
health, wives and husband’s socialization, and wives clothing expenditure. The questionnaires 
were completed across Indonesian provinces where approximately 89% of the sample 
demographic identifies as Muslim.  
The difference-in-differences method involves taking a control group and a treatment 
group and applying some sort of treatment to assess the impact in both groups pre- and post-
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treatment. In the study, non-religious non-Muslims underwent various combinations of religion 
and religiosity to examine the effects on women’s bargaining power across categories. 
Respondents who answered as very religious, religious, or somewhat religious were analyzed 
separate from those respondents who only answered very religious to examine differences in 
impact. Controls were added for sex, education level, and age to account for any differences in 
regression results.  
While specific programming and resources can be beneficial to target women, as the next 
section outlines, I find no significant evidence of the impact of religiosity on women’s 
bargaining power across all categories. I find, however, the constant, non-religious non-Muslims, 
is statistically significant for all categories, suggesting the mean of the control groups are 
different than zero. When controlling for education, however, certain educational levels 
demonstrate the positive and statistically significant impact on women’s bargaining power for 
certain categories.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews empirical 
literature to establish background, Section III discusses the Indonesian setting, Section IV 
discusses the experiment and empirical approach, Section V presents two sets of results, and 
Section VI concludes with discussion.  
 
II. Review of Empirical Literature 
 
Previous literature outlines a “unitary” household was considered standard for most 
household bargaining models, which assumes that household members hold the same preferences 
based on an aggregate utility function (Agarwal, 1997). In the 1997 study done by Bina Agarwal, 
she attempts to employ more complex models to encompass intrahousehold decision making 
from a gender perspective. In addition, Agarwal suggests extending the bargaining model 
approach beyond the household into the community is imperative to understand the foundation 
on which these households are embedded: giving an idea to the social norms such as religion that 
shape the decision-making process.  
 In contrast to the more commonly accepted unitary approach, there are less agreed upon 
approaches to bargaining power: cooperative, noncooperative, and collective (Agarwal, 1997). 
Cooperative bargaining assumes members of a household bargain over pooled income, whereas 
noncooperative relaxes that assumption where each member of the household is responsible for 
his or her own utility. The bargaining approach contains cooperation and conflict as well as 
power, or the strength of one of the participating members’ fallback position. Members of the 
household cooperate to hopefully make each better off, and that can take the form of who does 
what, who allocates what goods and services, etc. Until this study, policymakers assuming the 
unitary model directed resources to male household heads. However, a bargaining model could 
potentially take into account gender and point policymakers to the differences in efficiency, 
welfare, and equity implications by each gender of the recipient. Agarwal’s study identifies 
complex determinants in bargaining power which implies both the social norms and external 
institutions affecting outcomes of bargaining.  
Some of the economic outcomes that researchers have analyzed regarding religion 
include the effects of living arrangements and family planning across various studies. What 
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individuals do with the shared space within a household plays a large part in decision-making. A 
Pew Research Center study took a look across 130 countries to find that religious affiliation 
changes household dynamic (Pew Research Center, 2019). Household size and type are ways to 
compare living arrangements across the world. This study found that Muslims live in the largest 
households with an average of 6.4 people, Hindus at 5.7, Christians with 4.5, and Buddhists with 
3.9 (Pew Research Center, 2019). The most common household, around 38% of the population, 
lives with extended family, however, Hindus are the religious group more likely to live with 
extended families.  
Religious texts play a role in guiding marriage and the care of elders among other topics. 
These texts often promote specific family formations and assign roles for members to play within 
the household. In an interesting case, Nigeria’s population is almost split between Muslims and 
Christians, whereas Muslims reside with approximately three more people than their Christian 
counterparts. This exemplifies the complication of isolating the causal impact of religion which 
is linked to not only economic and geographic factors, but also legal and cultural factors (Pew 
Research Center, 2019).  Referring back to Indonesia, whose Muslim population accounts for 
87% of the population, the living arrangements may illuminate how households are shaped in 
terms of marriage, childbearing, and resource allocation (United Nations, 2019).   
In addition to the conversation surrounding living arrangements, a study in Northwestern 
Tanzania analyzed how gender and religion impact the reception of family planning. Individuals 
in Mwanza, Tanzania participated in twenty-four focus groups divided into gender-specific and 
religion-specific, Muslim and Protestant Christian, discussions surrounding family planning 
utilization (Sundararajan et al, 2019). Within the women’s discussions, they expressed concern 
for the negative effect of contraceptive on their health and children, however, they also expressed 
interest in the ability of family planning to allow them to pursue income-generating activities 
while fulfilling household duties.   
Results indicated that male authority with female embodied knowledge leads to the need 
for negotiation or no use of contraceptives (Sundararajan et al, 2019). In addition, participants 
differed in regard to the acceptance of family planning in respective religions. In this particular 
study, gender is an important factor in who “decides” the utilization of family planning. While 
males are considered the primary decision-makers about family planning, females describe an 
“embodied knowledge” of being able to make the decision about family planning. Men are 
considered heads of households in Mwanza; therefore, they are considered the ones who make 
the decision about family planning. This can have subsequential effects such as who makes 
decisions about the child when they are born, how is income allocated to cover the needs of 
children, medical services, etc. With religion showing strong influence in the uptake of family 
planning, the potential of religiosity affecting other aspect of household bargaining seems more 
plausible.  
 In addition, a study done by Pangaribowo, Tsegai, and Sukamdi in Indonesia using the 
IFLS dataset analyzed women’s bargaining power and household expenditure by gender in 
Indonesia. Authors found that women’s share of household assets and social capital on 
household food and nonfood expenditures varied. Women’s asset shares were positively 
associated with expenditures on meat while conversely, women’s asset shares had negative 
effects on adult goods expenditures such as tobacco and alcohol (Pangaribowo, Tsegai, Sukamdi, 
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2018). Furthermore, this study shows positive association with nonfood expenditures such as the 
education of children. Results also show that male-ownership of asset is still dominant across the 
country. The study also takes a look at community engagement programs such as Pemberdayaan 
Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK) and POSYANDU, both well-known women’s communities. 
Most notably, the social capital of attending these programs had positive effects on 
intrahousehold power relations (Pangaribowo, Tsegai, Sukamdi, 2018). Knowledge is one way to 
enhance awareness of women regarding topics such as nutrition, education, and more, thus 
transforming the decision-making process to be more efficient within the household. While not 
necessarily linking religion or religiosity to gender-differentiate household bargaining, 
Pangaribowo, Tsegai, and Sukamdi’s study sheds light on the positive outcomes of female 




Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and the fourth most populous nation 
in the world. With a population of approximately 270.2 million, roughly 26.42 million 
individuals live below the poverty line (World Bank, 2020). Indonesia’s effort to reduce poverty 
has made incredible gains since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and it is now recognized as an 
emerging middle-income country. Indonesia’s average GDP per capita is roughly $4,136, 
however, with such economic growth does not necessarily mean economic development (World 
Bank, 2020). Approximately 12.6% of the population still struggles to access clean drinking 
water and 39.2% of the population have limited accessibility to sanitation services (World 
Population Review, 2020). Despite this, Indonesia has a relatively high literacy rate of 95.4%.  
Indonesia is unique in the sense that household dynamic, especially the role of women 
inside and outside of the household, has shifted dramatically over the past few decades following 
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Religious intensity has heighted as well with Indonesia 
recognizing five major religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism.  
Indonesia has more than 300 ethnic and linguistic groups, the largest being Javanese, as well as 
over 700 spoken languages, the most widespread being Bahasa Indonesia. Indonesia is also the 
world’s most populous Muslim-majority county where 87% of the population identifies as 
Muslims. Despite this majority, the Indonesian government officially recognizes Islam, 
Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism, where 9.87% are 
Christian, 1.69% are Hindu, .72% are Buddhist, and .56% pertain to other religions (World 




This study was completed through the use of the IFLS panel data and documentation, 
specifically the data in the fourth wave of the IFLS questionnaire. Respondents were asked 
questions regarding consumption, income, assets, education, migration, household 
characteristics, marriage, etc. This study focuses on the responses regarding religiosity on a scale 
from 1 to 4, 1 being very religious and 4 being not religious, as well as households whose 
members identify as Muslim. Those who responded as “very religious,” “religious,” or 
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“somewhat religious” were combined into a “religious” variable which is analyzed in this study. 
Outcome, or the dependent, variables in this study were asked to each respondent separately. The 
respondent would be asked, for example, “who makes decisions regarding food expenditure,” or 
“who makes decisions regarding your child’s health.” Respondents would then choose a 
household member from A to P corresponding to the household member who made that specific 
decision. Options of household members included respondent, spouse, mother, father, son, 
daughter, etc. For this study, responses regarding who decided specific food and nonfood 
household expenditures were parred to only those respondents who were either the head of 
household or the spouse, which in this case would be A or B. 
These questions were employed to capture whether religiosity and religion plays a role in 
who makes the decisions within a household and whether patriarchal stereotypes can be 
empirically significant. These questions were also used to capture whether more religious or less 
religious individuals allow women to make decisions in the household. The religion of primary 
focus is Islam, considering 87% of the population identifies as Muslim. Eight categories of 
decision-making were analyzed to capture if different types of expenditures played a role in who 
made those decisions in regard to the religion and religiosity of those households. The categories 
are food expenditures, large non-food expenditures, children’s clothing, education, and health, 
wife’s clothing and wife versus husband socialization expenses.  
 
ii. Hypothesis 
I hypothesize that religious Muslim households would show that women’s household 
decision-making is less likely than non-religious non-Muslims for food expenditures, large 
expenses, children’s clothing, education, and health expenses and husband socialization expenses 
potentially due to stereotypical patriarchal norms within religious beliefs. I hypothesize husband 
socialization will be the decision with the lowest likelihood of women being allowed to make 
this decision. I hypothesize Pesantren, an Islamic boarding school that focuses on religious texts, 
in very religious households will have a negative and significant effect on women’s bargaining 
power. I also hypothesize that results with only very religious respondents reported will have a 
greater impact on wife’s decision making than less religious counterparts.  
 
iii. Empirical Strategy  
A linear regression model looks at the effect that one or several independent variables has on 
one or many dependent variables. The independent variable, if manipulated, models the 
prediction in change in the dependent variable. Due to the nature of the IFLS panel data, the 
difference-in-differences technique was utilized in this study to include multiple observations 
across the same household. The difference-in-differences method compares the changes in 
outcome over time between the treatment group and the control group to estimate the overall 
impact of an interaction (World Bank, 2021). In this study, non-religious non-Muslims would be 
the control group and the treatment of interest would apply various combinations of religiosity 
and religion to compare these effects on household decisions. To compute the difference-in-
differences method, you first calculate the before-after difference in the outcome (Y) for the 
treatment group, then do the same for the comparison group. The difference between the control 
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group and the comparison group forms the difference-in-differences estimation which is modeled 
as follows (Albouy):  
 
𝐷𝐷 = (?̅?𝑇𝑟𝑒,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − ?̅?𝑇𝑟,𝑃𝑟𝑒) − (?̅?𝐶,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − ?̅?𝐶,𝑃𝑟𝑒) 
 
This model represents where ?̅?𝑇𝑟𝑒,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is religious Muslims,  ?̅?𝑇𝑟𝑒,𝑃𝑟𝑒 is religious non-
Muslims, ?̅?𝐶,𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is non-religious Muslims, and ?̅?𝐶,,𝑃𝑟𝑒  is non-religious non-Muslims. In addition, 
I include a community fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the household level. This 
technique captures how very religious or religious individuals are more likely to allow wives to 
make decision within the household compared to various combinations of religious and non-
religious Muslims and non-Muslims. 
This study models the research design of Pangaribowo, Tsegai, Sukamdi’s 2018 study which 
analyzed women’s bargaining power and household expenditures through the role of gender-
differentiated assets and social capital, or the participation of women in community groups such 
as POSYANDU and PKK. Instead of measure women’s social capital and assets in comparison 
to budget share of food and nonfood expenditure, this study will be observing the interaction of 
religion and religiosity to capture those individuals who are more likely to allow women’s’ share 
of household decision-making. In order to examine women’s household decision- making, the 
function is modeled as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑋𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑅𝐺 + 𝜀 
 
The dependent variable is Yit where it represents specific household decisions. This study 
observes decisions surrounding food expenditure, large non-food expenditure, children’s 
clothing, education, and health, wife’s clothing, and husband and wife socialization expenditures. 
The independent variables are 𝑋𝑅 and 𝑋𝐺  which represent religion and religiosity, respectively. 
𝑋𝑅𝐺 is the interaction of religion and religiosity and 𝜀 is the error term (Pangaribowo, Tsegai, 
Sukamdi, 2018). Controls added to account for age, age squared, sex and education levels of 
elementary, junior high, senior high, special school for disabilities, and Pesantren, a Muslim 
boarding school.  
The main independent variable in this study focuses on the interaction of those who identify 
as Muslim and very religious. Since this study focuses on male and female household 
interactions, any observation that was not specified as head of household or spouse was not 
observed in this study. The constant captures non-religious non-Muslims. 𝑋𝑅 captures the change 
in 𝑌𝑖𝑡 among non-religious Muslims and non-religious non-Muslims. 𝑋𝐺  captures the change in 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 among religious non-Muslims and non-religious non-Muslims. 𝑋𝑅𝐺  captures how the 
interaction of religion and religiosity increase the likelihood of 𝑌𝑖𝑡 among Muslims compared to 
non-Muslims.  
A total of 10,900 observations are included in this study accounting for only those 








Table I: Sample Demographics  
Demographic 
Characteristic 
































Junior High  
Senior High  
More Than HS 






















Marital Status Married 
 
























Table I describes the sample demographics based on responses gathered from Book K and Book 









i. Main Results 
Table II: Effects of Religious Muslim Households on Wife’s Decision-Making 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 












Religious -0.200* 0.201 0.100 0.167 0.178 0.0666 -0.124 0.208 
 (0.101) (0.133) (0.134) (0.129) (0.133) (0.140) (0.133) (0.139) 
         
Islam -0.146 0.174 0.142 0.218 0.191 0.0639 -0.103 0.219 
 (0.110) (0.136) (0.138) (0.132) (0.137) (0.146) (0.138) (0.143) 
         
Religious Islam 0.151 -0.166 -0.0933 -0.169 -0.165 -0.0200 0.147 -0.219 
 (0.109) (0.136) (0.139) (0.132) (0.136) (0.146) (0.138) (0.143) 
         
Constant 0.776*** 0.635*** 0.559*** 0.608*** 0.634*** 0.610*** 0.650*** 0.542*** 
 (0.102) (0.133) (0.133) (0.129) (0.133) (0.140) (0.133) (0.139) 
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 
R2 0.096 0.156 0.155 0.165 0.167 0.135 0.151 0.144 
Adjusted R2 -0.005 0.062 0.060 0.072 0.074 0.038 0.057 0.048 
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses 




Table II reports the likelihood of religious and non-religious Muslims to allow women to 
decide on the eight categories of expenditure decisions compared to religious and non-religious 
non-Muslims. First, the constant is statistically significant, suggesting the mean of the control 
groups are different than zero. In the first column, those who reported religious but not Muslims 
are 20% less likely to allow wives to decide on food expenditure than non-religious non-
Muslims. In the same column, row 2 captures how Muslims who report not religious are 14.6% 
less likely to allow wives to decide of food expenditure than non-religious non-Muslims. Row 3 
compares religious impact on decision making when comparing Muslims and non-Muslims. The 
coefficient represents the difference-in-differences estimate. This estimate represents how much 
the average outcome of the treatment changed after applying the impacts of religion and 
religiosity compared to what the average outcome would be if that treatment was not applied. 
The expected mean change in women’s food expenditure decision-making is 15% more likely 
between religious and non-religious Muslims compared to religious and non-religious non-
Muslims. The difference in food expenditure decision-making by taking religious Muslims and 
non-religious Muslims is greater than the difference in food expenditure decision-making by 
non-religious Muslims and non-religious non-Muslims. Despite this, religiosity does not have 
impact due to lack of statistical significance.  
In addition to food expenditure decision-making, large expenditure decision-making 
shows similar results. Column 2 reports how religious non-Muslims are 20.1% more likely to 
allow women to make large expenditure decisions and non-religious Muslims are 17.4% more 
likely to allow women to make that same decision. The expected mean change in women’s large 
expenditure decision-making is 16.6% less likely between religious and non-religious Muslims 
compared to religious and non-religious non-Muslims. Likewise, for children’s clothing, 
education, and health decision-making, the difference in religious and non-religious Muslims are 
9.3%, 16.9%, and 16.5% less likely to allow women to make these decisions in comparison to 
religious and non-religious non-Muslims, respectively. Again, religiosity does not have a 
statically significant impact on these household decisions.  
The last categories of decision-making also lack statistical significance when analyzing 
the impact of religiosity when comparing Muslims and non-Muslims. Expenditure decisions 
surrounding husband and wife’s socialization expenditures reports how religious non-Muslims 
are only 6.66% more likely to allow women to make husband socialization decisions and non-
religious Muslims are roughly the same. Conversely, religious non-Muslims are 20.8% more 
likely to allow women to make their own socialization decisions and non-religious Muslims are 
roughly the same21.9% more likely. The impact of religiosity in column 8 makes the likelihood 
of women’s making decisions over their own socialization 21.9% less likely compared to 
roughly 2% for husband’s socialization expenditures when comparing Muslims and non-
Muslims. Wife’s clothing expenditure decision-making similarly shares a lack of statistical 
significance when analyzing the impact of religiosity.  
Overall, the difference-in-differences estimates for the impact of religiosity are not 
statistically significant for all categories of decision-making. However, all constants show that 
non-religious non-Muslims likelihood to allow women to make decisions regarding food, 




Table III: The Effects of Religious Muslim Households on Wife’s Decision-Making Controlling for Sex, Age, & Education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 












Religious -0.0382 0.193 0.177 0.176 0.192 -0.0419 -0.0485 0.278* 
 (0.0725) (0.137) (0.133) (0.125) (0.130) (0.132) (0.131) (0.134) 
         
Islam -0.0302 0.163 0.183 0.217 0.195 -0.00513 -0.0499 0.272* 
 (0.0790) (0.140) (0.137) (0.129) (0.134) (0.137) (0.135) (0.136) 
         
Religious Islam 0.0459 -0.156 -0.142 -0.173 -0.173 0.0535 0.0976 -0.263 
 (0.0791) (0.140) (0.138) (0.129) (0.133) (0.138) (0.136) (0.137) 
         
Female -0.577*** 0.0184* -0.257*** -0.0388*** -0.0616*** 0.342*** -0.255*** -0.259*** 
 (0.00866) (0.00727) (0.00858) (0.00731) (0.00704) (0.00867) (0.00980) (0.00844) 
         
Age 0.00210 0.000511 0.00230 0.00444 0.00603* 0.00263 -0.000371 0.00167 
 (0.00231) (0.00224) (0.00273) (0.00243) (0.00236) (0.00250) (0.00277) (0.00232) 
         
Age Squared -0.0000230 -0.0000251 -0.0000623* -0.0000707** -
0.0000852*** 
-0.0000188 0.00000119 -0.0000131 
 (0.0000220) (0.0000222) (0.0000268) (0.0000238) (0.0000233) (0.0000245) (0.0000266) (0.0000220) 
         
Elementary 0.0119 0.0178** 0.0117 0.0129* 0.0151* 0.0212** 0.00476 0.0165* 
 (0.00652) (0.00592) (0.00707) (0.00639) (0.00604) (0.00704) (0.00797) (0.00672) 
         
Junior High 0.0129 0.0178** 0.0112 0.0119 0.0144* 0.0218** 0.00533 0.0164* 
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 (0.00661) (0.00599) (0.00717) (0.00648) (0.00612) (0.00714) (0.00808) (0.00682) 
         
Senior High 0.0124 0.0181** 0.0115 0.0123 0.0151* 0.0223** 0.00496 0.0170* 
 (0.00676) (0.00611) (0.00732) (0.00659) (0.00623) (0.00729) (0.00828) (0.00697) 
         
More Than High 
School 
0.0120 0.0176** 0.0117 0.0123 0.0148* 0.0218** 0.00548 0.0164* 
 (0.00681) (0.00616) (0.00738) (0.00666) (0.00630) (0.00735) (0.00832) (0.00701) 
         
Special School -0.0607 -0.0960** -0.0542 -0.0513 -0.0734* -0.102* -0.0316 -0.0893* 
 (0.0387) (0.0350) (0.0417) (0.0372) (0.0353) (0.0417) (0.0468) (0.0398) 
         
Pesantren 0.0138 0.0236 0.00625 0.00203 0.0141 0.0146 0.00638 0.0219 
 (0.0141) (0.0127) (0.0147) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0150) (0.0161) (0.0145) 
         
Other 0.00983 0.0187** 0.0135 0.0122 0.0147* 0.0222** 0.0101 0.0175* 
 (0.00703) (0.00644) (0.00786) (0.00694) (0.00659) (0.00758) (0.00864) (0.00733) 
         
Constant 0.834*** 0.639*** 0.639*** 0.560*** 0.545*** 0.424** 0.707*** 0.523*** 
 (0.0933) (0.147) (0.148) (0.139) (0.143) (0.147) (0.149) (0.145) 
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 
R2 0.433 0.163 0.232 0.175 0.181 0.270 0.216 0.235 
Adjusted R2 0.369 0.069 0.145 0.082 0.088 0.187 0.128 0.149 
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses 





Table III reports how likely religious and non-religious Muslims are to allow women to 
decide on the eight categories of expenditure decisions compared to religious and non-religious 
non-Muslims while controlling for age, sex, and education. Again, row 3 captures the expected 
mean change in women’s decision-making between religious and non-religious Muslims 
compared to religious and non-religious non-Muslims. While results are not statistically 
significant, there is a positive change is the likelihood of wives to make husbands socialization 
expenditure decisions based on the impact of religiosity. Controlling for sex, results show how 
religiosity impacts females compared to males and results are statistically significant and 
negative for all categories except large purchase expenditure decision. Age has very little impact 
on decision making. 
From the descriptive statistics, almost 50% of respondents reported completing an 
elementary level education. The results are somewhat varied. While the percentages are small, 
the results indicate that an elementary education is positively and significantly associated with 
women’s bargaining power for large expenditures, children’s education and health, and 
husband’s and wife’s socialization expenditures. However, results also indicate that an 
elementary education is positivity but not significantly associated with women’s bargaining 
power for food expenditures, child clothing, and wife’s clothing decisions. To focus on 
Pesantren, this specific type of schooling had very small percentage impacts and was positively 




Table IV: The Effects of Very Religious Muslim Households on Wife’s Decision-Making 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 












Very Religious 0.0331 -0.0197 -0.00583 -0.0258 0.0157 -0.0111 0.0434 0.0156 
 (0.0460) (0.0361) (0.0459) (0.0405) (0.0379) (0.0419) (0.0442) (0.0364) 
         
Islam 0.00710 0.00793 0.0509 0.0511* 0.0294 0.0428 0.0451 0.00426 
 (0.0225) (0.0206) (0.0281) (0.0252) (0.0247) (0.0251) (0.0279) (0.0232) 
         
Very Religious 
Islam 
-0.0183 0.0123 -0.0186 -0.00292 -0.0244 0.000710 -0.0170 -0.00867 
 (0.0511) (0.0402) (0.0506) (0.0446) (0.0419) (0.0467) (0.0493) (0.0415) 
         
Constant 0.574*** 0.836*** 0.659*** 0.776*** 0.808*** 0.677*** 0.523*** 0.746*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0187) (0.0254) (0.0229) (0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0253) (0.0211) 
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 
R2 0.096 0.156 0.155 0.165 0.167 0.135 0.152 0.144 
Adjusted R2 -0.005 0.061 0.060 0.072 0.073 0.038 0.057 0.048 
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 Table V: The Effects of Very Religious Muslim Households on Wife’s Decision-Making Controlling for Sex, Age, & Education  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 












Very Religious -0.0144 -0.0215 -0.0306 -0.0316 0.00800 0.0151 0.0206 -0.00685 
 (0.0380) (0.0359) (0.0422) (0.0406) (0.0377) (0.0400) (0.0424) (0.0349) 
         
Islam 0.0125 0.00594 0.0403 0.0449 0.0246 0.0498* 0.0461 0.0114 
 (0.0217) (0.0207) (0.0277) (0.0251) (0.0246) (0.0245) (0.0280) (0.0234) 
         
Very Religious 
Islam 
0.0258 0.0172 0.00898 0.00561 -0.0145 -0.0245 0.00461 0.0121 
 (0.0425) (0.0400) (0.0468) (0.0446) (0.0417) (0.0443) (0.0474) (0.0396) 
         
Female -0.577*** 0.0189** -0.256*** -0.0385*** -0.0611*** 0.342*** -0.255*** -0.258*** 
 (0.00866) (0.00726) (0.00858) (0.00730) (0.00702) (0.00866) (0.00980) (0.00844) 
         
Age 0.00207 0.000642 0.00248 0.00458 0.00614** 0.00268 -0.000362 0.00174 
 (0.00231) (0.00224) (0.00273) (0.00243) (0.00237) (0.00250) (0.00278) (0.00232) 
         
Age Squared -0.0000227 -0.0000261 -0.0000639* -0.0000718** -
0.0000861*** 
-0.0000192 0.00000112 -0.0000136 
 (0.0000220) (0.0000222) (0.0000268) (0.0000238) (0.0000234) (0.0000245) (0.0000267) (0.0000220) 
         
Elementary 0.0120 0.0181** 0.0120 0.0131* 0.0153* 0.0211** 0.00487 0.0169* 
 (0.00651) (0.00592) (0.00707) (0.00638) (0.00603) (0.00705) (0.00797) (0.00672) 
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Junior High 0.0130* 0.0182** 0.0115 0.0121 0.0147* 0.0218** 0.00543 0.0168* 
 (0.00661) (0.00600) (0.00717) (0.00647) (0.00611) (0.00714) (0.00808) (0.00682) 
         
Senior High 0.0125 0.0185** 0.0118 0.0125 0.0154* 0.0222** 0.00504 0.0174* 
 (0.00676) (0.00612) (0.00732) (0.00658) (0.00622) (0.00729) (0.00827) (0.00697) 
         
More Than High 
School 
0.0121 0.0180** 0.0120 0.0125 0.0150* 0.0217** 0.00560 0.0168* 
 (0.00680) (0.00616) (0.00738) (0.00665) (0.00629) (0.00736) (0.00831) (0.00702) 
         
Special School -0.0610 -0.0978** -0.0556 -0.0522 -0.0746* -0.102* -0.0323 -0.0915* 
 (0.0387) (0.0350) (0.0417) (0.0371) (0.0353) (0.0417) (0.0467) (0.0398) 
         
Pesantren 0.0140 0.0240 0.00644 0.00210 0.0143 0.0144 0.00669 0.0225 
 (0.0141) (0.0127) (0.0147) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0150) (0.0161) (0.0145) 
         
Other 0.00987 0.0191** 0.0138 0.0124 0.0149* 0.0221** 0.0102 0.0179* 
 (0.00703) (0.00644) (0.00786) (0.00693) (0.00659) (0.00758) (0.00863) (0.00734) 
         
Constant 0.799*** 0.827*** 0.811*** 0.733*** 0.731*** 0.379*** 0.656*** 0.795*** 
 (0.0651) (0.0617) (0.0750) (0.0673) (0.0651) (0.0688) (0.0781) (0.0658) 
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 10900 
R2 0.433 0.163 0.232 0.175 0.181 0.270 0.216 0.235 
Adjusted R2 0.369 0.068 0.145 0.082 0.088 0.187 0.128 0.148 
Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.0
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Table IV reports the effects of strictly those respondents who reported very religious in 
the IFLS questionnaire. In comparison to the results from households who report varying levels 
of religiosity, there are interesting differing results per category of decision-making. While not 
statistically significant, the impact of high religiosity now negatively affects the likelihood of 
women to make food expenditure decisions. Even though these percentages are relatively 
insignificant, the impact of high religiosity now positively affects the likelihood of women to 
make large expenditure decisions.  
Table V describes how likely solely very religious and non-religious Muslims are to 
allow women to decide on the eight categories of expenditure decisions compared to religious 
and non-religious non-Muslims while controlling for age, sex, and education. Again, while the 
percentages are still small, the results mirror that of the religious results. An elementary 
education is positively and significantly associated with women’s bargaining power for large 
expenditures, children’s education and health, and husband’s and wife’s socialization 
expenditures Contrary to the aforementioned hypothesis regarding Pesantren, very religious 
Muslims reflect very small percentage impacts that are positively but not significantly associated 
with women’s bargaining power for all categories of decision-making. Overall, there is not much 
difference between religious and strictly very religious respondents in regard to women’s 
bargaining power.  
 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 Women’s bargaining authority has important implications for policy design. Resource 
distribution, child outcomes, and power relations are important when determining policy 
interventions, especially program targeting. This study examined the effects of varying levels of 
Muslim religiosity on women’s bargaining power across eight critical categories using the 
difference-in-differences method.  
Although stereotypical norms would imply women’s bargaining power decreases with 
high levels of religiosity, there found to be no statistical significance for this claim across all 
categories. There was little to no difference found when separating religious from very religious 
respondents. This conclusion is inconsistent with the hypotheses made, claiming that for all 
categories, there would be a statistically significant and negative impact on the likelihood of 
women to make decisions within the household. Controlling for sex, age, and education, 
percentage changes within these control variables were very small with few holding statistical 
significance. Pesantren was positively but not significantly associated with women’s bargaining 
power, which was contradictory to prior beliefs surrounding an education primarily focused on 
religious contexts. Results also indicate that religiosity impacts sex in a way that is statistically 
significant and negative for seven of the eight categories.  
These results indicate that programs targeting or catering to religious norms are not 
adequate in improving women’s autonomy within the household. While programs targeting 
women have been proving to improve other aspects of household decision-making, such as child 
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